Previous research examining the outcomes of free votes concludes that voting behaviour is determined in large part by MPs' personal preferences. However, most studies do not measure preferences directly and ignore other possible determinants of voting behaviour. This piece illustrates the need to address these shortcomings before one concludes that preferences explain the outcomes of free votes. I illustrate this by examining a series of divisions on the issue of House of Lords reform. Using direct measures of preferences and controlling for alternative explanations, the analysis suggests MPs' preferences had little effect on voting behaviour on this issue.
In studying the voting behaviour of Members of Parliament (MPs), 'party' plays an influential role in most legislatures, with high levels of cohesion observed on nearly every division. Two explanations for this cohesion are given primacy: while MPs may be kept disciplined by the party whip when their preferences deviate from the rest of their party, party cohesion is also reinforced by the shared preferences of MPs belonging to the same party (Krehbiel, 1993; van Vonno et al., 2014) . Because most divisions are whipped, and because party unity is almost universally high, it is difficult to discern the impact of preference-based effects in relation to discipline-based effects.
Many studies examining the impact of preferences on voting behaviour rely on 'free votes' -which are divisions on which the whips are relaxed and MPs are allowed to vote as they wish (Cowley, 1998; Richards, 1970) -in order to control for the effects of party discipline.
Though party leaders' decisions to hold free votes (like other roll-call votes) are non-random (Carrubba et al., 2006; Hug, 2010 ) -e.g. when party leaders fear they will not be able to maintain discipline on bills where the party's MPs have diverging preferences (Cowley, 1998: 181) -studying free votes provides an opportunity to examine how MPs behave in the absence of the whips. Most previous research examining MPs' voting behaviour on free votes finds that, in the absence of the whips, MPs still tend to coalesce along party lines (Cowley and Stuart, 1997, 2010; Hibbing and Marsh, 1987; Marsh and Read, 1988; Mughan and Scully, 1997; Overby et al., 1998 Overby et al., , 2011 Pattie et al., 1994; Plumb, 2013 Plumb, , 2015 Plumb and Marsh, 2011) . In line with preference-based explanations, the fact that variables used to measure MPs' personal preferences explain much of the variance in voting behaviour on free votes leads to the conclusion that shared preferences explain the high levels of party cohesion observed on most divisions (both free and whipped), while a lack of party unity can be explained by diverging intra-party preferences.
Despite the importance accorded to shared preferences in previous studies of voting behaviour on free votes, there remain reasons for scepticism regarding the effects of preferences. This paper conducts an exploratory study of two potential shortcomings with conclusions regarding preference-based effects on MPs' voting behaviour. One is that most studies lack direct measures of MPs' preferences. Some studies have attempted to operationalise preferences using proxies related to MPs' personal characteristics (e.g., Hibbing and Marsh, 1987; Marsh and Read, 1988; Mughan and Scully, 1997; Overby et al., 1998 Overby et al., , 2011 Pattie et al., 1998) , which may be problematic because they do not directly measure MPs' preferences. Others have operationalised preferences using measures derived from MPs' previous voting behaviour (e.g., Baughman, 2004; Plumb and Marsh, 2011; Plumb, 2015) , which may be problematic given that MPs' voting behaviour may not be reflective of their actual preferences (Clinton, 2012) . Absent direct measures of preferences, it is difficult to conclude that these variables impact MPs' voting behaviour.
The other is that many studies examining free votes have not accounted for two alternative explanations that may overlap with MPs' preferences. For one, because MPs have reelection related incentives to reflect the preferences of their constituents (André et al., 2014a (André et al., , 2014b Cain et al., 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995) and have been shown to express the interests of their constituents on divisive votes (Baughman, 2004; Overby et al., 2011; Pattie et al., 1994 Pattie et al., , 1998 Sieberer, 2015) , what appear to be personal preference-based effects may instead be due to MPs articulating the preferences of their constituents. Additionally, most previous studies do not account for lingering party effects that are independent of both discipline-and preference-based effects. Drawing from studies showing that party unity remains high even when MPs' preferences are not likewise unified (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011) and when whips are absent (Norton, 2003) -particularly when issues are consequential to parties' agendas (Cowley and Stuart, 1997, 2010; Overby et al., 1998; Plumb and Marsh, 2013) -other research suggests MPs may coalesce due to an underlying sense of loyalty to the party that is independent of the other 'party'-based effects (Raymond and Overby, 2016; Russell, 2014; see also van Vonno et al., 2014) . Because these alternative hypotheses may overlap with MPs' preferences, it is important to account for these explanations before one concludes that preferences impact MPs' voting behaviour.
This paper explores these issues by examining a series of divisions in 2003 regarding
House of Lords reform that were all decided (in the negative) as free votes. Each measure failed in large part because parties were split -to varying degrees -on these divisions, which previous literature would suggest can be explained by intra-party variance in personal preferences regarding reform (McLean et al., 2003) . Examining this particular set of free votes provides an interesting and important chance to observe whether preferences did in fact explain the observed disunity: because free votes allow for intra-party splits in voting behaviour, these divisions allow us to determine the relative effects of preferences versus alternative hypotheses. Additionally, by using survey measures of MPs' preferences from the British Representation Study (BRS) 2001 (Norris and Lovenduski, 2001 ), this particular study allows us to measure MPs' preferences directly, and thus addresses the other noted shortcoming in previous studies. If personal preferences do not explain the disunity in MPs' voting behaviour on these free votes, this would suggest that future analyses of free votes need to pay closer attention to the issues raised here in order to reduce the possibility of reaching spurious conclusions regarding the effects of personal preferences.
In the next section, I review the issue of House of Lords reform in greater detail in order to provide appropriate context for the analysis. Following that, I discuss the details of my research design before moving to a discussion of the results. A final section concludes with thoughts putting the findings into broader context, as well as a discussion of the implications of this study for future research on the analysis of legislative voting behaviour.
House of Lords reform
To explore the issues discussed above regarding the appearance of personal preference- While most research on free votes examines divisions that pass and exhibit high levels of 1 Readers looking for in-depth accounts of attempts at reforming the House of Lords (including this and other episodes) are directed to the excellent reviews and analyses conducted elsewhere (Ballinger, 2014; Kelso, 2009; Raina, 2015; Russell, 2013 ; on this specific episode, see McLean et al., 2003 in turn why parties demonstrated so little cohesion -as previous research has concluded (McLean et al., 2003) . Thus, while this study focuses on one specific attempt to reform the House of Lords (which is but one set of divisions regarding one issue), these particular divisions offer a clear test of the party-as-preference argument.
Even though the intra-party splits observed on these divisions suggest personal preferences led many MPs to deviate from the rest of their parties, those MPs who voted along party lines may have done so due to the partisan nature and consequences these divisions instead of expressing their personal preferences. House of Lords reform was an important partisan issue, as Labour committed in both its 1997 and 2001 manifestos to reforming selection to the House of Lords. Though Labour party unity was weaker on these divisions than in previous research, some
MPs may still have recognised the partisan implications of these divisions and, thus, may have been motivated to vote according to a sense of loyalty to the party instead of their personal preferences -similar to the behaviour of MPs seen in previous research on free votes with partisan consequences (Cowley and Stuart, 1997, 2010; Plumb and Marsh, 2013 (Henry, 2012; Ipsos MORI, 2014; Russell, 2013) . try to outflank Labour after the Blair government began to walk back its promises for an elected second chamber (Cowley and Stuart, 2004, pp. 357-358) , the party's members and voters have long been sceptical of reforming the House of Lords: Conservative voters have been consistently and significantly less likely to support election (Henry, 2012; Ipsos MORI, 2014) , less favourable of ending life peerages (Russell, 2013, pp. 244-245) , and more likely to oppose reform in general (Henry, 2012 
Research design
To estimate the impact of personal preferences on MPs' voting behaviour, I analyse Table 1 , the BRS produces samples on each division that are broadly representative both of the final outcomes and of the party-specific vote shares for the three largest parties.
6 Table 1 To control for the possibility that MPs' voting behaviour is affected by lingering party 6 The BRS sample is also representative of the full membership of the House of Commons in terms of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat vote share variables, as well as MPs' ages and gender. While non-Labour and non-incumbent MPs are slightly underrepresented, these differences are not substantial (differences of 7 and 4 percentage points, respectively). Table 2 about here Instead, these findings suggest that voting behaviour was determined more by constituency pressures and lingering party loyalties than by personal preferences. Although the relatively low percentages of observations correctly predicted by each model suggest limits to the power of these explanations in this instance, the fact remains that the results suggest constituency pressures and party loyalties had stronger effects on voting behaviour than preferences for an elected House of Lords. In order to display the estimated effects of constituency pressures more easily -given the conditional nature of the hypothesised effects - Figure 1 presents predicted probabilities displaying the impact of the Liberal Democrat vote 10 One concern with examining the impact of MPs' preferences for an elected House of Lords on their voting behaviour is that some evidence provided by McLean et al. (2003) suggests MPs voted tactically. Specifically, the concern is that MPs who preferred an elected House of Lords may not have supported the motions proposing to elect 80 or 60 per cent of the Lords, which might result in type-II errors when estimating the effect of preferences for an elected House of Lords on these two motions (but not when analysing the motions proposing to appoint or elect 100 per cent of the Lords, as these motions represent the two logical extremes -for/against an elected House of Lords). To address these concerns, I re-estimated each model after omitting respondents who voted for an all-elected House of Lords but not in favour of the 80 or 60 per cent elected motions in order to remove those potentially voting strategically from the sample. Because the results of these models confirmed the findings presented here, I conclude that the weak effects of personal preferences seen here are not due to strategic voting.
11 One caveat to this conclusion is in order. Although this study employed direct measures of MPs' personal preferences, the research design applied here cannot rule out the possibility that the reason for the weak effects of preferences was due to changes in MPs' preferences after hearing the arguments made for/against reform in the debates. However, because most models of voting behaviour assume MPs hold fixed preferences, finding that MPs' preferences shift during debates would weaken the conclusion MPs' preferences impact their voting behaviour. Instead, this would suggest the effects of MPs' preferences are more endogenous than exogenous (perhaps endogenous to party loyalties or constituency pressures if MPs were persuaded by positions taken by other MPs from their parties or by the concerns raised by their constituents), and thus less important for explaining voting behaviour than previous research has concluded.
share variable on voting behaviour between Labour and non-Labour MPs, while Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities associated with the Conservative vote share variable between Labour and non-Labour MPs. To account for differences in these variables' estimated effects between Labour and all other MPs, I present predicted probabilities calculated for both sets of MPs holding all other variables at their median values.
Figures 1 and 2 about here
Regarding the impact of Liberal Democrat vote shares on MPs' voting behaviour, the results in Figure 1 suggest that variation in Liberal Democrat vote shares influenced MPs' voting behaviour on each motion. Though the predicted probabilities of supporting the three electionrelated motions are slightly lower among Labour MPs (and slightly higher on the all-appointed measure) than among other MPs, higher Liberal Democrat vote shares are associated with increased support for the three election-focused motions (and decreased support for the allappointed motion) for both Labour and other MPs. These estimated effects were statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better, as indicated by the coefficients for the Liberal Democrat vote share variable in each model in Table 2 . In keeping with the literature suggesting MPs will vote to reflect constituency preferences on free vote divisions as a means to increase their chances of re-election (Baughman, 2004; Overby et al., 2011; Pattie et al., 1994 Pattie et al., , 1998 
Conclusion
While a growing body of research examining free votes concludes that party cohesion remains high due to shared preferences, this paper has explored two issues which suggest greater caution is needed in interpreting the reasons for unity/disunity on free votes. Specifically, this paper has examined the importance of the direct measurement of preferences and accounting for alternative explanations overlapping with personal preferences. .7
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